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A Psychological Approach to Understanding the Legal
Basis of the No Duty to Rescue Rule*
I. INTRODUCTION

Two years ago a college-age male raped and killed a girl in a casino
in Las Vegas. 1 The killer was at the casino with a friend, and there is evidence that the friend knew what was happening and did nothing to stop
the rape. 2 Many questioned why no charges were being brought against
the friend, why he had no legal duty to help this girl who his friend had
raped and murdered. 3 Similarly, in the early sixties, Kitty Genovese was
repeatedly attacked over a period of thirty-five minutes, during which
time thirty-eight of her New York neighbors saw what was happening
and did not summon help. 4
Is a person who sees another in danger obligated to help in some
way? In order to establish a cause of action for negligence, there must be
a breach of some legal duty. 5 In the United States, there is generally no
legal duty to rescue. 6
A sees B, a blind man, about to step into the street in front of an approaching automobile. A could prevent B from so doing by a word or
touch without delaying his own progress. A does not do so, and B is
run over and hurt. A is under no duty to prevent B from stepping into
7
the street, and is not liable to B.

One professor relates her experience teaching torts to her students, a
majority of whom find the "legal 'no duty' rule reprehensible." 8 However, after the rule and its rationale are explained to the students, and
they are able to "take a distanced, objective posture informed by liberal-

Copyright© 2000 by David N. Kelley.
I. See Life in Prison for Killer of Girl in Casino, CHI. TRm., Oct. 15, 1998, at 14.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See A.M. ROSENTHAL, THIRTY-EIGHTWITNESSES 11-14 (1964).
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 314 (1965).
6. See Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Ajfi171Ultive Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879 (1986). There are some exceptions to
this rule which will be discussed later.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 314 cmt. c, illus. 1 (1965).
8. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31,
33 (1988).
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ism's concerns for autonomy and liberty, [and] many come to accept the
9
legal rule that intuitively had seemed so wrong to them." It may be disturbing to think that a person walking along the shore of a lake, who sees
a victim drowning, has no legal duty to throw a rope, or reach a stick out
10
to help that person. This is the case even if there is no hint of danger to
the potential rescuer. Neither tort law nor criminal law has recognized
general liability for failure to act.
Scholars have both criticized and supported the no duty to rescue
rule. Those who criticize the rule suggest it is inefficient, detached, or
individualistic." Those who support the rule suggest that "legal inducements may impede [the] motivation" of a rescuer helping for altruistic
reasons, or out of desire to be regarded as a hero. 12 Supporters of the current law have also suggested that the law should not impose morality on
individuals, and that the cost on individuals may be too great if liability
is imposed. 13 Two major approaches that have been taken to understand
and explain the law as it stands are (1) law and economics, and (2) moral
considerations.
While it seems there would be a positive impact on society if the
courts or legislatures would impose some sort of duty to rescue, social
scientific research seems to indicate that any legal duty should be applied
with careful limits. 14 Part II of this Comment wiii explore the nature of
the common law no duty to rescue rule including the numerous exceptions which have been imposed by the courts through its history. Part III
wiii summarize and explain the position of those who use law and economics to either support or criticize the law. Part IV will discuss ethical
arguments in favor and against the no duty to rescue rule. Finally, Part V
will analyze the no duty to rescue rule in light of the current theories of
psychology on helping behavior, including why people do or do not help
in various situations, and what social or psychological impediments must
be overcome in order for people to be likely to rescue.

9. !d.
10. See Francis Bohlen, Moral Duty to Aid Others as the Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L.
REV. 217 (1908) (citing Francis Bohlen, The Basis of A.ffirnwtive Obligations in the Law of Tort, 53
U. PA. L. REV. 209 (1905)).
II. See generally Bender, supra note 8; Marc A. Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A
Comment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1972); Eric H. Grush, The Inefficiency of the No Duty to Rescue
Rule and A Proposed Similar Risk Alternative, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 881 (1998); Wallace M. Rudolph,
The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule, 44 NEB. L. REV. 499 (1965).
12. William Landes & Richard Posner, Salvors, Findors, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978).
13. See Richard L. Hasen, The Efficient Duty to Rescue, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 141, 147
(1995).
14. See infra notes 121, 124, 126, and 133.
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II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

The Restatement Second of Torts section 314 states, "the fact that
the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for
another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to
take such action." 15 An important distinction between misfeasance and
non-feasance must be recognized in order to understand the law as it
stands. "Misfeasance differs from non-feasance in two respects; in the
character of the conduct complained of, and second, in the nature of the
detriment suffered in consequence thereof." 16 A person will be held liable if their misfeasance causes or compounds the injury, but will not be
held liable if their non-feasance resulted in greater injury. While this difference is a foundation of the no duty to rescue rule, 17 "[t]he clever law
student is ... able to tum commissions into omissions by arguing, for
example, that negligent driving is nothing more than the failure to
brake." 18 Due to the lack of clarity between action and inaction, the no
duty to rescue rule has many exceptions. 19 Liability for non-feasance first
appeared in situations where there was some special relationship between
the parties. 20 In these cases, the defendant was found to have some kind
of duty to aid or protect the plaintiff.
A. Exceptions to the No Duty to Rescue Rule

Although some exceptions have been created by statute, the majority
arose out of court decisions imposing liability in specific circumstances.
Exceptions to the no duty to rescue rule include (1) statutes imposing an
affirmative duty, and (2) special relationships, such as that among a
ship's crew or between an employer and employee, a carrier and its passengers, and innkeepers and guests. 21
1. Statutes

Various types of statutes have been adopted that impose a duty on
one person to help another in need. The primary example are "hit and
run" statutes, which require a driver involved in an automobile accident,
whether or not he was at fault, to give assistance to those injured. 22 When

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 314 (1965).
Bohlen, supra note 10, at 220.
See Levmore, supra note 6, at 879.
/d.

See
20. See
21. See
22. See

infra Part !I.A.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. C (1965).
infra Part II.A.2.
f?enerally 7A AM. JUR. 2DAutomobiles and Highway Traffic§ 354 (1997).
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driving an automobile, a person who causes injury cannot merely walk
away under a no duty to rescue rule. Aside from "hit and run" statutes,
other types of statutes that impose a duty to rescue those in danger have
been adopted as well. For example, a Vermont law states that:
[a] person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm
shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or
peril to himself or without interference with important duties owed to
others, give reasonable assistance to the ex~osed person unless that as3
sistance or care is being provided by others.

The duty to rescue is limited to where the rescuer can act without
putting herself in danger. A Minnesota statute, similar to the Vermont
statute, imposed a duty on persons who were "at the scene of an emergency."24 The Vermont statute imposes a duty on persons "who know
that another is exposed." 25 Both Rhode Island and Massachusetts enacted
statutes imposing a more limted duty to rescue. Under Rhode Island law,
a witness to a sexual assault must immediately notify the police. 26 The
Massachusetts statute applies to witnesses of armed robberies and homicides as well as rapes?7
2. Case Law

The case law exceptions to the no duty to rescue rule all arise out of
special relationships between the victim and the rescuer. One category of
exceptions to the no duty to rescue rule is that of the person who negligently injures another. "[C]ourts have broadened [the] rule, placing the
duty on anyone whose conduct-whether innocent or negligent-has

23. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973). The section continues stating:
(b) A person who provides reasonable assistance in compliance with subsection (a)
of this section shall not be liable in civil damages unless his acts constitute gross negligence or unless he will receive or expects to receive remuneration. Nothing contained in
this subsection shall alter existing law with respect to tort liability of a practitioner of the
healing arts for acts committed in the ordinary course of his practice. (c) A person who
willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not more than $100.00.
/d.

24. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 604.05 (repealed 1994).
25. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973).
26. See Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 423 (1985).
27. See R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 11-37-3.1-3.4 (Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
268, § 40 (West Supp. 1983).
Actually, the Rhode Island and Massachusetts statutes are 'rescue' statutes only to
the extent that police might be notified during the commission of a crime and might respond in time to prevent or mitigate harm. Since a witness could comply with their duty
by notifying police shortly after the commission of the crime, these statutes more closely
resemble the common law ban against 'misprison of felony.'
Silver, supra note 26, at 427 n. 35.
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caused injury or unreasonable danger." 28 By causing the initial injury, a
person becomes liable for the effects of that injury. Thus a special relationship is created between the injurer and the person injured.
Other exceptions to the no duty to rescue law have been imposed
through the courts over time. One type of exception is where there is a
working or quasi-partnership relationship between the rescuer and the
victim. For example, a ship's captain and crew have a duty to rescue
other members of the crew. In Harris v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 29 the
court held that the crew of a ship owes a duty to rescue one of its members who, even by his own neglect, falls into the sea. While Harris was
working, he fell overboard, and a fireman he had been working with
called "man overboard." Harris was about twenty-five feet behind the
boat, and the fireman picked up a hawser30 and threw it toward Harris,
but it was too heavy and did not reach him. 31 "No other effort was made
to throw a line or other device to Harris while he was in the water." 32 The
Harris court stated that there was no doubt that a legal obligation rested
upon the ship's crew to use due diligence to save another member of the
crew who had fallen into the sea. 33 As the court states, a person is "completely dependent for care and safety upon such succor as may be given
by the members of the crew." 34 The court noted the ease with which a
life buoy or other item could have been thrown to save Harris. However,
the court affirmed that the exception to the no duty to rescue rule did not
come from the ease of rescue, but from the relationship between the ship
and its crew? 5
Another exception to the general rule is that an employer has a duty
to her employee where in the course of that employment the employee
suffers injury. In Carey v. Davis, 36 an employee, who was excavating a
gravel pit, became overheated. The employee fainted, regained consciousness, resumed working and fainted again. His co-workers put him
into a wagon out in the sun and left him there for about four hours, causing his condition to worsen. The court stated the general rule, that there
is no legal duty "in the absence of any agreement or contract" to care for
28. Silver, supra note 26, at 426 (citing W. Prosser & W. Keeton, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56,
at 375 (5°' ed. 1984).
29. 50 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1931).
30. A hawser is a heavy cable or rope used in mooring or towing a ship. See id.
31. See id.

32. /d. at 867. There was a life buoy kept near the pilot house which White, the first mate,
could have reached within three to four seconds. He made no attempt to do so, and after not seeing
Harris, walked back into the pilot house after a couple of minutes. /d.
33. See id. at 868.
34. /d.
35. See id.
36. 180 N.W. 889 (Iowa 1921).

276

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 14

a sick or injured servant, 37 but then went on to hold:
Where in the course of his employment a servant suffers serious injury
or is suddenly stricken down in a manner indicating the immediate and
emergent need of aid to save him from death or serious harm, the master, if present, is in duty bound to take such reasonable measures or
make such reasonable effort as may be practicable to relieve him, even
though such master be not chargeable with fault in bringing about the
38
emergency.

Thus, a duty was imposed on employers because of their special relationship to the injured or suffering employee.
Another exception to the general rule is that a carrier has a duty to its
passengers. In Middleton v. Whiteridge, 39 the New York Court of Appeals held that a duty springs from "the contract to carry safely." 40 In this
case a man was riding a streetcar and experienced a cerebral hemorrhage.
The man rode for some time, and seemed okay to the conductor at first.
Later, the conductor noticed there was something wrong with the man.
He was vomiting, and according to the conductor, he looked intoxicated
and sick to his stomach. 41 The man died and medical evidence showed
that if the deceased had received proper care within one or two hours after the cerebral hemorrhage happened, he would have likely recovered.
The court held, "if a passenger becomes sick and unable to care for himself during his journey ... the carrier owes him an added duty resulting
from the change of situation."42 Thus, those whose work is in transport43
ing others have been held to have a duty to the passengers.
Other relationships have also been held to impose a special duty to
rescue despite non-involvement in the situation. This includes an innkeeper and his guests, such that "[a]n innkeeper is obliged, in the exercise of reasonable care, to protect his guests against assaults from any
one, including his employees." 44 Additionally, a police officer who has
37. See id. at 890.
38. /d.
39. 108N.E.I92(N.Y.1915).
40. /d. at 197.
41. See id.
42. /d.
43. See id. at 197. The court also noted, "the carrier is not bound, unless it has notice of the
fact, to observe that its passenger is ill." But if the crew knew or "had notice of the facts ... it was
their duty to give him such reasonable attention as the circumstances ... permitted." /d.
44. Dove v. Lowden, 47 F. Supp. 546, 548 (W.O. Miss. 1942). In this case the plaintiff was a
guest when he went into the hotel lunchroom for refreshments. According to the court, "[w]hile that
relation existed it is the law that the trustees owed the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect him
against injuries from assault, or otherwise, whether committed by employees or other guests. An
innkeeper is obliged, in the exercise of reasonable care, to protect his guests against assaults from
any one, including his employees." /d. In this particular case those accused of the abuse were not on
duty and not acting within the scope of their employment. Additionally, it appears that the injuries
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taken a person into custody owes a duty of care to that person. 45 This
duty is to exercise ordinary care to keep the prisoner safe and free from
46
harm generally. This includes protecting prisoners from harming themselves or from being harmed by others. 47 While the courts of the United
States have held to the general rule that there is no duty to rescue, they
have also seen the need for extensive exceptions to that rule. 48

B. The International Rule on Duty to Rescue
Many other countries around the world imposes a duty to rescue. In
49
Europe, the duty is widespread. The French Penal Code provides that:
[A]ny person who willfully fails to render or to obtain assistance to an
endangered person when such was possible without danger to himself
or others, shall be subject to [imprisonment] for no less than three
months nor more than five years, a fine from 36,000 to 1,500,000
50
francs, or both.

This rule is substantially harsher than the laws in Vermont and Minnesota, where the maximum stay in prison is one year. Germany enacted a
statute in 1935 which states:
Whosoever, in case of accident or common danger, or necessity, does
not render assistance, even though this is his duty according to sound
popular sentiment and, in particular, does not comply with the request
for assistance of a police agent, even though he could comply with the
request without serious danger and without the infringement of other

occurred off the premises of the defendant, and therefore the defendant innkeeper was not held liable
for the injuries to the plaintiff, despite the general duty to rescue. See also Lehnen v. E. J. Hines &
Co., 127 P. 612 (Ill. 1912).
45. See Thomas v. Williams, 124 S.E.2d 409 (1962).In this case a police officer arrested and
incarcerated a drunk prisoner. The prisoner had a lighted cigarette and matches on him. The officer
knew the condition of the prisoner and left him unattended in the cell. The mattress in the cell, upon
which the prisoner was lying, caught fire and the whole area filled with smoke. When the officer
came back in he did not remove the prisoner, but doused the cell and mattress with water, which
increased the amount of smoke. The prisoner died of exposure to fire and smoke. "This case establishes the standard of care owed by a law enforcement officer to a prisoner placed in his care and
custody - to keep the prisoner safe and free from harm, to render him medical aid when nece~sary,
and to treat him humanely and refrain from oppressing him. Georgia is in accord with the majority of
courts in imposing this standard of care." /d. at 413 (citing Anno. 14 A.L.R.2d 354 (1950)).
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See supra notes 29, 36, 44, and 45. Each of these cases represents an exception to the
general no duty to rescue rule.
49. See Thomas, 124 S.E.2d at 434.
50. /d. (quoting THE FRENCH PENAL CODE, in I The American Series of Foreign Penal
Codes (G. Mueller ed. 1960)).
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important duties, is punishable with prison for up to two years or with a
51
fine.

All of the Eastern European codes except Albania have similar stat52
.
. A menca,
.
utes regard mg
rescue. "In L atm
aImost every country ...
provides in its penal code for the punishment of bad samaritans." 53
It is clear that a large portion of the countries of the world has imposed some sort of duty to rescue. That duty is generally triggered by: (1)
awareness of someone in danger; (2) the ability for the potential rescuer
to help without putting himself or others in danger; (3) some sort of relationship between the victim and rescuer; and (4) the amount of "help"
required of the rescuer.
Ill. A Law and Economics Approach

Scholars have taken various approaches to analyzing the no duty to
rescue rule. Economical efficiency is one argument supporting this rule. 54
In order to illustrate this, William Landes and Richard Posner present a
scenario in which a person is presented with a choice between two activities, A and B, each having equal entertainment value. However, each of
these activities has a different magnitude of risk. If liability for nonrescue is imposed, those who could be potential rescuers will choose the
safer activity in order to avoid the potential liability involved with the
riskier activity. By doing so they have reduced the number of potential
rescuers in activity A because of the greater costs associated with the potential liability created by an affirmative duty to rescue. As the rule currently stands, there is no affirmative duty to rescue and therefore, according to Landes and Posner, a potential rescuer will not avoid the more
dangerous activity because the potential cost of liability is no greater
than the potential cost of liability for a safe activity. 55 Assume activity A
is swimming at the beach, and activity B is playing racquetball. Person X
enjoys both swimming and racquetball and is an excellent swimmer. If
liability were imposed based on an affirmative duty to rescue, X would
be more likely to avoid swimming, because X will be required to rescue
51. Alberto Cadoppi, Failure to Rescue and the Continental Criminal Law, in THE DUTY TO
RESCUE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 93, 101 (Michael A. Menlowe & Alexander McCall Smith
eds., 1993) (citing Para. 330c. StGB). The author reflects on the idea that the above cited statute
came from the Nazi regime. At the time, the previous weaker rule had been "strongly criticized and
considered the typical product of an individualistic and liberal society." /d. at 101. Since that time,
the statute has been amended and contains no references to the "sound popular sentiment." /d. at
101-102.
52. See id. at I 04.
53. /d.
54. See generally Landes, supra note 12.
55. See id.
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if there is an emergency. If those who are good swimmers avoid the activity because it is a dangerous activity, and an affirmative duty to rescue
increases the costs associated with that activity, there will be fewer potential rescuers participating in those activities. In the alternative, as long
as there is no legal duty, then the costs associated with swimming are not
any greater and people will continue to swim, and people will continue to
rescue out of altruistic motives. 56 According to Landes and Posner, the
rule as it stands is more efficient in that if an affirmative duty were imposed, potential rescuers would be likely to avoid risky activities because
of the higher cost associated with them, and the overall amount of rescuing would go down. 57 Landes and Posner similarly argue that imposing a
duty to rescue might decrease the number of people who rescue out of
altruism, because such people may be viewed as having acted only to
avoid the penalty. 58
Furthermore, the question asks how far the imposition of an affirmative duty to help may go. "Even if the rule starts out with such modest
ambitions, it is difficult to confine it to those limits." 59 What is the limit
on how much help a person must give in order to help another?
Take a simple case first. X as a representative of a private charity asks
you for $1 0 in order to save the life of some starving child in a country
ravaged by war. There are other donors available but the number of
needy children exceeds that number. The money means "nothing" to
you. Are you under a legal obligation to give the $10? Or lend it inter60
est-free? Does $10 amount to a substantial cost or inconvenience ... ?

While this deals with a charitable contribution as opposed to some
physical form of help, it is easy to see that the line between the two, if
there is one, is thin indeed. How far must a person go in order to help
someone? If a person sees another driving, and it sounds like their brakes
are about to give out, are they obligated to take some affirmative action
and warn or help the person with the squeaky brakes? "In each case, it
will be possible for some judge or jury to decide that there was something else which the defendant should have done .... "61
Additionally, there are a number of problems with imposing a legal
duty to rescue. The first question involves who should be made liable. In
56. See id.
57. See id. The authors admit that they have not proved that imposing liability for failure to
rescue would not be as efficient: "[w]e have merely suggested that the results under the common
law, occasionally imposing liability but mostly denying it, may be consistent with efficiency." Td. at
126.
58. See id.
59. Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 198 (1973).
60. !d. at 198-99.
61. /d. at 199.
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many situations there are many people around who could possibly help.
Is it proper to impose liability on all of them? What if rescue is easy for
some and more difficult for others? What if there is a large strong person
who is a good swimmer who could easily rescue a victim, and on the
other hand a small weak person who does not know how to swim? If they
are both sitting on the dock when a victim is drowning are they equally
obligated to rescue? Those in favor of imposing liability suggest these
cases be treated similarly to joint and several liability, similar to the
situation in which two hunters negligently shoot and one unintentionally
62
hits the third person. However, the problem with this is that each person may have heard a distant call for help and believed someone else is
there to help. The number of excuses for not helping may be large.
Establishing causation in a case such as this would be nearly impossible.
Some people suggest rescue should only be required if it is easy to
do and will not put the rescuer's life in peril. The problem with this idea
is that in an emergency a potential rescuer must then evaluate any situation and determine whether or not they might be put in danger by helping. This seems to be a very gray area in which it would be difficult to
determine liability. Should the person have reached in to save the drowning swimmer, or might she have been pulled in by the swimmer and been
placed in danger herself? In such a variety of situations it could be very
problematic for the courts to impose a general rule. On the other hand,
courts are often called upon to make these types of difficult decisions.
The rule encourages people to take steps to avoid dangers. Knowing
there is no legal duty to help, or be helped, people are more likely to take
63
care of themselves. If there were some duty to help, it is possible that
people would be less concerned about potential hazards because they
know that as long as someone is around, they are required to help. Those
who support the no duty to rescue rule see it as being an efficient rule 64
which encourages self-reliance65 and only makes a person responsible for
the harm she caused through her actions, as opposed to harm she could
have prevented by acting.
On the other hand, scholars have also posed economic arguments as
to why imposing a duty to rescue would be more efficient. 66 Rather than
looking at potential rescuers and victims as different classes of people as
67
has been done previously, some have suggested that those who are po-

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See Levmore, supra note 6, at 934 n. 180 (citing Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d I (1948)).
See Epstein, supra note 59, at 203.
See generally Landes, supra note 12.
See Epstein, supra note 59 at 203.
See Grush, supra note II, at 881.
This is the view that has been posed in the Landes & Posner argument. They argue that
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tential rescuers are also potential victims. 68 People are not necessarily
more likely to avoid an activity that is dangerous because they will be
called upon to be a rescuer. While imposing liability may increase the
costs associated with a particular activity for a potential rescuer, the costs
of participating in that activity are at the same time diminished because
the person weighing the alternatives would also know that they will
likely be rescued in the event that something unfortunate befalls them. In
response to the argument that the high cost associated with saving will
drive a person away, others have suggested that there are transaction
costs associated with changing a particular activity, and those costs may
outweigh the costs associated with imposing liability.
IV. A MORAL/PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH
Scholars have also taken a philosophical approach as to whether the
no duty to rescue rule is appropriate. Much of the argument regarding the
imposition of a duty to rescue is based on ethical considerations. John
Stuart Mill suggested that "the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community against his
69
will is to prevent harm to others." He further went on to clarify this assertion by saying, "His own good either physical or moral is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because
it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in the opinions of others to do so would be wise or even right." 70
According to this statement we should not be coerced by government
into helping others. The United States Constitution suggests part of its
purpose is to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Pos.
"71
tenty.
Therefore, is it proper to impose a moral duty to help others through
a legal obligation?
On the one hand, one may argue that the function of law is to promote
the common good or the greatest happiness of the greatest number. On

victims and potential rescuers are non-overlapping groups, assuming that people are either inherently
rescuers or inherently victims. See Landes, supra note 12, at 120 n. 95.
68. See Grush, supra note II, at 881.
69. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LiBERTY 30 (1859).
70. !d.
71. U.S. CONST. Preamble. Elaborating on the idea that one should not be coerced into
helping others, one commentator suggests:
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society
as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for
some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-4 (1971 ).
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the other, it may be argued that, when moral opinions differ, a tolerant
society should use law to enforce the moral convictions of some only
72
when absolutely necessary.

Is this an area that should remain as a moral duty as opposed to a legal duty? Michael Godwin suggests that "man's moral development requires the law's abstention from interference in private judgment ... " 73
Thus, in order to have sufficient moral development of citizens, citizens
must be allowed to act and make decisions for themselves rather than
having their morality legislated. By not making moral decisions for
themselves, people may never become intrinsically moral. Their actions
may be based merely on what the law requires them to do.
On the other hand, the law requires moral choices to be made all the
time, i.e. murder, theft, etc. In fact, critics of Mills suggest that because
we are all a part of society, nobody knows the types of harm we cause to
74
others through our actions. Furthermore, in order to have liberty, there
must be structure: "[l]ike a building, every society has a structure that, by
constraining the actions of its members, permits them at the same time to
act to accomplish their ends. Without any structure, chaos would reign
and the current population could not be sustained."75
A major reason for imposing a duty to rescue is that it is the moral
thing to do. 76 "In defining duty, what matters is that someone, a human
being, a part of us, is drowning and will die without [imposing] some affirmative duty." 77 Furthermore, "the drowning stranger is not the only
person affected by the lack of care."78 As part of a community, we should
not just stand by and watch another person in danger of death or major
injury without being affected ourselves. 79 People cannot simply refrain
72. Michael A. Menlowe, The Philosophical Foundations of a Duty to Rescue, in THE DUTY
TO RESCUE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 93 (Michael A. Menlowe & Alexander McCall Smith eds.,
1993).
73. Weinrib, supra note 57, at 265 (commenting on I W. GODWIN, ENQUIRIY CONCERNING
POLITICAL JUSTICE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON GENERAL VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS 165 (I. Kramnick ed.
1976)).
74. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LiBERTY AND MORALITY 5 (1963).
75. 2 RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 2
(1998).
76. See generally Menlowe, supra note 72 (commenting on HENRY SIDGWICK, THE
METHODS OF ETHICS Book IV, Ch 3 (London, 7u. ed., 1922). Menlowe notes:
It is evident, he thinks, that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is produced by
imposing a duty to rescue in certain circumstances. So an exception is required to the
general principle that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is produced by allowing individuals freely to contract their services. But the exception is itself justified on
utilitarian grounds because it maximizes happiness without undesirable side-effects.
!d. at 23.
77. Bender, supra note 8, at 34.
78. /d.
79. See id.
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from making a choice to help. In that non-action, the person has made a
decision not to help and to allow another to continue suffering. One author sees humanity as more important than other concerns and suggests
"a strong legal value [be] placed on care and concern for others rather
than on economic efficiency or individualliberty." 80
What assumptions must be made and accepted to say that this is not a
plausible argument? Do we naturally assume that individualism is better
than a shared existence, and that economic efficiency is the most important goal of society? Perhaps we should be looking at the question in
more humanistic terms and see our duty to each other as people as more
important than a goal of economic efficiency. According to Bender, doing so would "transform the core of negligence law to a human response
,81
system.
Upon establishing a moral duty to rescue, it is necessary to ask
whether that moral obligation should be transformed into a legal obligation. Those who do not think there should be an obligation say it would
interfere with liberty and altruistic actions. 82 However, it can also be argued that the laws we set up for ourselves in tum give us a moral guidepost. Our moral values are often shaped by the laws which govern the
society of which we are a part. 83
Law not only reflects society's moral values, but also helps shape them.
As one commentator asserts, 'Legal and moral rules are in symbiotic
relation; one learns what is moral by observing what other people ...
tend to enforce.' Accordingly, a legal duty to rescue would increase the
number of persons who feel morally compelled to offer emergency aid.
This, in turn, would increase the likelihood that people would render
assistance in situations in which the failure to do so would go undetected.84

The existence of a legal duty would encourage rescue in four subtly
different ways: 1) some people would act out of a desire to be law abiding, 2) others would act out of fear of legal sanctions, particularly when
witnesses were present, 3) some who are timid would be provided with
the necessary motivation to intervene, and 4) others would be moved into
action by a heightened sense of the morality of rescue.
Instead of the law impairing moral development, as has been previously suggested, 85 the law is likely to guide and improve moral sense. 86

80. !d.
81. !d.
82. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
83. See Silver, supra note 26, at 428-29.
84. !d.
85. See id.
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One study analyzed the correlation between the law and the specific society's attitudes. 87 The study found that "the existence of a legal duty ...
correlated with the respondents' view of how the law should treat people
who do not help in low-risk situations." 88 The number of people who
thought that nothing should be done was lowest in countries where there
was a legal obligation to help, and highest in countries where there was
no legal obligation to help. Furthermore, "jail sentences for violators
were preferred by 22 percent in Germany, 15 percent in Austria, and 2
percent in the United States." 89 This seems to show that people's moral
values were correlated with the law in their country. In countries where a
legal duty had been imposed, people felt like there was a stronger obligation to help, and more people felt like the person who failed to help
should be punished. 90 These arguments suggest a moral obligation can
and should be imposed legally. Doing so would increase people's awareness of the need to help others, and also likely adjust their attitudes to the
idea that we have a duty to help others we see in trouble.
As was stated earlier, a main reason why some people suggest a legal
duty to rescue should be imposed is based on the idea that "lives would
be saved and injuries avoided." 91 As the law stands, the United States is a
society in which it is legally acceptable to stand by and watch another in
distress without doing anything to help. Those who would not impose liability suggest it is not the province of the law to force people to act
morally. Those who would have liability imposed argue that the law
would be an effective tool to encourage rescue. 92

86. See Silver, supra note 26, at 428-29 (quoting Anthony D' Amato, The "Bad Samaritan"
Paradigm, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 798, 809 (1975)).
87. See Franklin, supra note II, at 59 (citing Zeisel, An International Experiment on the Effects of a Good Samaritan Law, in THE GoOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 141, 209 (J. Ratcliffe ed.
1966)).
88. /d.
89. !d.
90. See id.
91. D' Amato, supra note 86, at 809:
[Other] [s]tudies support the existence of this relationship. In one, a group was given a
number of fact situations, such as that of a bystander who watched idly as a man drowned
10 feet from shore. They were told that an attempt to rescue was required by law. Another group was given identical facts, except that an attempt to rescue was not required.
A greater proportion of the first group felt that the actions of the passive observer were
morally wrong. The existence of a legal duty apparently helped the subjects define the
failure to rescue as immoral
!d. (cited in Silver, supra note 26, at 429 n. 43).
92. See id.
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V. A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH
While moral/philosophical, and economic efficiency paradigms have
been used to support or refute the need for imposing liability on the person who fails to rescue another in need, none of these have explained
why people do or do not help in certain situations. The economic models
suggest that everything is done in terms of what will offer the highest
utility while keeping costs at a minimum. 93 These models, however, often fail in their attempt to capture the human experience. Are all decisions people make based on their estimation of a cost benefit analysis?
Are even a significant part of the decisions people make based on a cost
benefit analysis? Psychologists have shown that people often take cognitive shortcuts labeled heuristics, in order to process the vast amount of
information that is constantly taken in. 94 This being the case, it is difficult to suppose that in emergency situations, people are likely to take
time to make a cost benefit analysis before deciding whether or not to
help another in need. The field of psychology is based around understanding how and why people act the way they do. Social psychology is
aimed at understanding the effect on a person's behavior of both personality and situational influences. As part of this study several theories
have arisen as to why people do or do not help in certain situations, and
these can give insight into why the no duty to rescue rule is fashioned as
it is.
A. Self-Interested Help
Much of the theoretical basis for psychological research assumes that
people are generally self-interested. 95 In an address to the American Psychological Association, David Campbell stated, "Psychology and psychiatry ... not only describe man as selfishly motivated, but implicitly or
explicitly teach that he ought to be so."96 William James, a founding father of American psychology, expressed a similar view. He stated, "Each
mind, to begin with, must have a certain minimum of selfishness in the
shape of instincts of bodily self-seeking in order to exist. This minimum
must be there as a basis for all further conscious acts, whether of self93. See generally Landes, supra note 12.
94. See A. Tversky & D. Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
95. See David T. Campbell, On the Conflicts Between Biological and Social Evolution and
Between Psychology and Moral Tradition. 30 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1103, 1104 (1975).
96. /d.
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negation or of a selfishness more subtle still .... "97 A major answer to
the question of why people help others is that they do so for egoistic concerns. Some of the egoistic concerns may include material or social rewards; another motivation may be to reduce the aversive feelings associated with seeing someone else in distress. 98
One group of researchers suggested people will be more likely to
help when they feel bad because helping is a way for people to make
themselves feel better. 99 Those theories which focus on reduction of
negative feelings associated with seeing others in distress suggest that
often the easiest way to get rid of those feelings is to run away from the
situation rather than help. Thus, rather than a deep seated moral need to
help others, perhaps much of the helping behavior we do or do not see is
based on selfish concerns. If it is rewarding enough to help, or aversive
enough not to help, people will be more likely to do it. Accepting this
premise, the law as it stands would not be most effective. Imposing a
general duty to help would be more effective at encouraging helping behavior because people would be motivated to help by the desire to avoid
the negative consequences of not helping. As will be discussed below,
some psychologists have suggested alternative theories of motivation for
helping behavior.
B. Empathy-Altruism
In contrast to the idea that all behavior, including that of helping, is
based on selfish motives, Daniel Batson suggests that many helpful actions performed by people may be motivated by altruism, which is the
100
desire to increase another's welfare. According to Batson's EmpathyAltruism hypothesis, if a person feels empathy for another person in
need, they are more likely to help that person than if they do not feel empathy .101 In this model, the first step is for a person to perceive that another person needs help. 102 Once a person sees that help is needed, the
second step is whether that person adopts the other person's perspective.103 If they do, they will have empathic concern, but if they do not,

97. WILLIAM JAMES. PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 115 (1890).
98. See Sagi & Hoffman, Empathic Distress in Newborns, 25 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL.
254 (1976).
99. See Robert Cialdini et al., Transgression and Altruism: A Case for Hedonism, 9 J. OF
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 502 (1973). This was called Mood Enhancement. This study reinforced the idea that people were more likely to offer help, or volunteer for a project, after thinking
they had accidentally harmed someone.
I 00. See C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION 6 (1991).
101. Seeid.at74.
102. See id. at 76.
103. See id.
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they will experience personal distress. 104 Concern leads to an altruistic
105
motivation with the goal of reducing the other person's distress. Lack
of concern leads to an egoistic motivation and a desire to reduce a person's own distress. 106 One study predicted and found that those high in
empathy would be likely to help even when they had a chance to easily
escape the situation. 107 Alternately, those who did not feel empathy for
the victim helped in order to reduce their own aversive feelings, but if
there was an easy chance to escape without helping, they were more
likely to take it. 108
Legal scholars have suggested that altruistic rescue may decrease if
liability is imposed for failing to rescue because then rescuers will be
perceived as less altruistic, and their motives will be based around potential compensation from rescuing another. 109 According to psychological
theorists, this motive for rescuing would be considered an egoistic concern as opposed to an altruistic concern. If empathy is the primary explanation for why people help others, then it is unlikely that imposing a duty
to rescue others in need would change the amount of help that is generally given. 110 However, if there is more than one explanation or motivation behind why people help, then viewing some helping behavior as
egoistic and some as altruistic is appropriate. Based on these two explanations, imposing a duty to rescue would likely increase the number of
rescues because those who rescue for altruistic purposes will not decrease, and the number of those who help for egoistic purposes will increase.

104. See id.
105. See id.
I 06. See id. While much of this seems to be common sense, it goes against many of the theoretical foundations of psychology which have previously been noted. In order to test this idea the
researchers lead a subject into a room, told them they would be working with another person, and let
them read an information sheet. The sheet informed subjects that one subject would perform a task
while the other would observe, and that the parts would be assigned randomly. The other "subject"
who is actually a confederate working with the researchers, arrives and is chosen as the person to be
shocked. She is hooked up and receives some shocks, she looks extremely uncomfortable, and as she
asks for a glass of water she tells the researcher that she had a bad experience with an electric fence
as a child. But she says she will continue the experiment. The researcher then asks if the subject will
take the confederate's place. Empathy was measured by self-reports. As predicted, those higher in
empathy took on the shock. Even when the researchers provided a way for the subject to leave, they
took on the shocks when they felt empathy for the confederate. /d.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See generally Landes, supra note 12.
110. See BATSON, supra note 100, at 51.
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C. Factors Which Predict Helping

Besides internal motivation, there are other factors that have been
shown to reliably predict helping. These factors include similarity, closeness, and belief in a just world. 111 Research has indicated that we are
112
more likely to help those who are similar to us. A sociobiological explanation for this is that we are genetically predisposed to help our species continue, and those who look more similar to us are more likely to
be genetically similar to us. 113 Similarly, the law reflects this bias towards those who are our offspring by imposing a duty on parents to res114
cue their children.
Additionally, people are more helpful to others they know and care
about than they are to total strangers or merely superficial acquaintances.115 This research is useful in understanding the exceptions to the general rule of no duty to rescue. The major exception to the rule is when
there is some sort of special relationship. Parents have a duty to their
116
children, and spouses have a duty to each other. One explanation as to
why this particular duty has been implemented at common law is that
there is a closeness in these relationships, and it is expected when people
have a close relationship they will help one another.
A final factor that predicts whether or not a person is likely to help is
117
a belief in a just world. This belief rests on the assumption that people
get what they merit. People who are good and do good things will be
118
This belief
blessed, and those who do not, and are bad, will suffer.
leads people to attribute bad characteristics to those who are suffering
and this may justify a person who does not help someone they perceive
119
to be suffering. In this way, the usual distress involved in seeing an-

Ill. See J. F. Dovidio, Helping Behavior and Altruism: An Empirical and Conceptual Overview, in 17 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 404-409 (L. Berkowitz ed., 1984).
112. See BATSON supra note 100, at 51.
113. See id. (citing D. Krebs, The Challenge of Altruism in Biology and Psychology, in
SOCIOBIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS, ISSUES, AND APPLICATIONS 81 (C. Crawford et al. eds.,
1987)).
114. See Silver, supra note 26, at 425.
115. See Matthew Clark, Recipient's Mood, Relationship Type, and Helping, 53 J.
PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 94 ( 1987).
116. See Silver, supra note 26, at 425
117. See generally MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FuNDAMENTAL
DELUSION ( 1980).
118. See id.
119. See id.
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other person suffer is lessened. 120 By understanding this general belief, it
is easier to understand why certain people are not likely to help another
in need. Imposing a general rule requiring people to help goes against
some people's assumptions about the world.

D. The Problem With Bystander Intervention
A final theory for understanding what inhibits people from helping in
certain circumstances is the bystander effect. 121 According to researchers,
there are basic social norms which promote helping victims, however
there are also fears which block people from helping. Some of these fears
include, "fears of physical harm, public embarrassment, involvement
with police procedures, lost work days and jobs, and other potential dangers."122 While logically it would seem that the more people there are
around when you are in need, the more likely you are to receive help, this
is not the case. One study simulated a person having a seizure. When
people thought they were alone, they were likely to help 85% of the time.
Those who thought there were others around only provided help 31% of
the time. 123 From this and further research, Bib Latane and John Darley,
two social psychologists, were able to point out a series of steps or hur124
dles a person must go past in order to make the decision to help. These
hurdles can be used to understand why people do not help at times, and
in tum why the law has not imposed a general duty to rescue.

1. Noticing
The first step is noticing. 125 A person must notice that someone needs
help, or that something unusual is happening. One of the biggest barriers
against noticing a situation is being in a hurry. People who are pressed
for time are not as likely to notice a problem. The likelihood a person
will notice a problem is also a factor of the size of the community a person is in. People in larger cities are less likely to help than those who live
in smaller, rural communities. 126 For example, in a small community,
seeing a person lying on the sidewalk may immediately signal the need

120. See id.
121. See John M. Darley & Bibb Latane, Bystander Intervention In Emergencies: Diffusion of
Responsibility, 8 1. PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 377 (1968).
122. /d.
123. See id.
124. See BIBB LATANE & JOHN M. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER: WHY DOESN'T
HE HELP? 31 ( 1970).
125. See id.
126. See N. M. Steblay, Helping Behavior in Rural and Urban Environments: A MetaAnalysis, 102 PSYCHOL. BULL. 346 (1987).
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for rescue, whereas in a large city, it may be more common. This obstacle could be used to show that a duty to rescue should not be imposed
because it would be difficult to prove whether a person actually noticed
the emergency or not. However, imposing a legal duty may also have the
effect of requiring people to be more aware of their surroundings and
possible emergencies. This would have the effect of reducing generally
the obstacle of failure to notice.

2. Interpreting
A second hurdle that must be crossed is interpreting the event as an
.
. where 1t
. appears someone
emergency. 121 Wh en we come upon a SituatiOn
is in trouble, but no one else has done anything to help, we often look to
others to determine how we should behave. This is called social validation, which suggests that we look to others for cues on how to act when
128
we are in an unfamiliar situation or setting. In the case above where a
person has come upon a situation which appears to be an emergency, if
others are not doing anything, it is likely that the newcomer will also do
nothing. This comes from the fear of embarrassment that may result for
having misunderstood the situation and rushing in where help was not
really needed.
Furthermore, a phenomenon called pluralistic ignorance occurs when
everyone present in a situation assumes there is no emergency because
129
nobody is acting like there is an emergency. This happens not only in
emergency situations, but can also happen in the classroom. People may
be afraid to ask a question for fear of looking stupid. Then, when the
question is not asked, it is possible that nobody understands.
If a duty to rescue were to be legally imposed then the costs associated with liability for not helping would likely be higher than the social
costs of looking foolish upon trying to help at the wrong time. If people
knew the law requires them to rescue, then they may be primed and
ready to interpret the situation as an emergency and overcome this obstacle. The costs associated with liability would be greater than those associated with the social embarrassment of attempting to help when none
was needed. If the social norm is to take action and immediately aid an127. See LATANE, supra note 124, at 31-32. In a similar type of study, researchers place subjects into a room either alone, or with two other non-reacting confederates to perform a task. During
their task, smoke began filling the room. Those who were in the room alone reported the smoke seventy-five percent of the time. Those who were in the room with the non-reacting confederates only
reported the smoke ten percent of the time. Bibb Latane & John M. Darley, Group Inhibition of Bystander Intervention in Emergencies, 10 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 215 (1968).
128. See id.
129. See D.T. Miller & C. McFarland, Pluralistic Ignorance: When Similarity is Interpreted as
Dissimilarity, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 298 (1987).
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other in distress, it seems that imposing a legal duty would also help
overcome this second obstacle.

3. Taking Responsibility
The third hurdle a person must overcome when deciding to help is
taking responsibility .130 Even if a person notices and recognizes the
emergency, they must still take responsibility before they will act. 131 This
is less likely to happen if others are around. 132 When others are around
people tend to assume that someone else will do something to help the
victim. Again, contrary to what would seem logical, the larger the number of bystanders the less likely people are to help. 133 In large groups
people tend to feel less responsible. According to this theory of reduced
responsibility, "when diffusion occurs, an individual recognizes and continues to believe that help is needed and should be given but also believes that this help will be given by other bystanders." 134 The presence
of others allows the person, who has seen an emergency, to assume that
others will take care of the emergency. When it is assumed that someone
else has or will take care of the problem it is both unnecessary, and might
even seem foolish to step in and do something more.
This common thought process would be altered by imposing a duty
to rescue. If people know they are going to be held accountable for noticing a situation and not helping, there is a higher probability they will act.
However, the reverse may be true as well. Despite the knowledge that
they could be held liable, people may assume that someone else will take
care of the emergency and therefore they will not be held liable, and they
will not have had to extend any effort to help. Therefore, the mere imposition of liability may not help overcome this hurdle.

4. Deciding how to provide help
The fourth hurdle is deciding how to best provide the needed help. 135
Often people are not trained to provide medical assistance in the case of
a car accident. There may be a fear of causing more harm than has already been done, and/or looking foolish when trying to help. 136 If others

130. See Darley, supra note 121, at 31.
131. See id.
132. See Darley, supra note 121, at 377.
133. See Leonard Sickman, Social Influence and Diffusion of Responsibility in an Emergency,
8 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL., 438 (1972).
134. See id. at 445.
135. LATANE, supra note 124.
136. See Frederick M. Siem & Janet T. Spence, Gender-Related Traits and Helping Behaviors, 51 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 615 (1986). This research seemed to indicate that with
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are around, a potential rescuer may feel afraid to perform in front of
them, especially if she is not confident in her ability to help. She may
feel that somebody else on hand would perform better in this situation.
This is another hurdle which would not be overcome by imposing liability. If a person feels like they do not know how to help, the increased
stress of potential criminal or civil liability could either inhibit their performance, or motivate them to escape the situation without helping. 137 In
this case, imposing liability could potentially decrease rescue.
As has been presented there are various psychological hurdles that
can stop a person from helping another in need. A person must notice the
emergency situation and interpret it as such, she must take responsibility
to do something, decide how to help, and then actually perform the help.
In the cases where the court made exception to the no duty to rescue rule,
the scenario was such that these previously mentioned factors were not
138
as prevalent. These cases involve some kind of relationship between
the potential rescuer and victim, or a situation in which the rescuer
should know that the victim is in danger.
VI. CONCLUSION

Taking a psychological perspective on the no duty to rescue rule
gives a dual perspective. On the one hand, the law as it stands reflects the
unwillingness of lawmakers to impose a general duty to rescue, and reflects the difficulty in understanding why in any one instance a person
fails to help. Rather than being individualistic and morally vacant, the
law may reflect the psychological impediments that inhibit rescue. The
psychological phenomenon of bystander intervention seems to show,
[T]hat a victim may be more likely to get help, or an emergency may be
more likely to be reported, the fewer people there are available to take
action. It also may help us begin to understand a number of frightening
incidents where crowds have listened to but not answered a call for
help. Newspapers have tagged these incidents with the label 'apathy.'
We have become indifferent, they say, callous to the fate of suffering
others. The results of [these] studies lead to a different conclusion. The
failure to intervene may be better understood by knowing the relation-

regard to helping behavior "the primary difference between men and women is that men are more
likely to decide that intervention is not required because of their greater fear of appearing foolish or
gullible."' /d.
137. See Robert B. Zajonc, Social Facilitation, 149 SCIENCE. 269 (1965). According to Zajonc's studies, the arousal caused by stress or by the presence of others will facilitate a person's
dominant response. In easy tasks, increased arousal leads to increased performance. In difficult
tasks, increased arousal leads to decreased performance. See id.
138. See supra Part II.A.2.
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ship among bystanders rather than between a bystander and the victim.l39

However, this perspective also shows that the law could potentially
be used to increase helping behavior. The law and people's morality
form a kind of symbiotic relationship. 140 The law is shaped by the public
morality, and the law shapes people's morality.
Therefore, rather than imposing a general duty and harsh penalties
for those who fail to rescue in an emergency situation, it may be more
effective to impose a limited duty to help 1) in situations which pose no
threat to the rescuer, or 2) when there is a special relationship as has been
defined in the common law exceptions to the duty to rescue rule, the failure to rescue would result in a minor penalty. Imposing a duty to rescue
would put people on notice of the need to rescue and help break down
some of the psychological barriers which may prevent people from performing a rescue.

David N. Kelley

139. LATANE, supra note 124, at 221.
140. See Silver, supra note 26, at 428-29.

